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FAMILY LAW-ADOPTION-FOSTER PARENT STANDING IN
ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that foster parents lack standing to initiate adoption proceedings
absent consent from a child welfare agency.
Chester County Children & Youth Services v. Cunningham, 656
A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1995).
In 1992, foster parents Donald and Middie Cunningham (the
"Cunninghams") attempted to adopt two foster children who had
been living with them.' Chester County Children and Youth
Services (the "Agency"), which placed the children with the
Cunninghams, obtained legal custody of the children upon
termination of the natural parents' rights.2  Subsequently, the
Cunninghams made a request to the Agency that they be
permitted to adopt the children. The Agency did not approve of
the adoption based on the age of the Cunninghams and,
therefore, declined to give consent.' The Agency also denied the
adoption of the two children because it would put a substantial
strain on the family because the Cunninghams had recently
adopted two other foster children.' The Agency claimed that
permanent placement of the foster children with the
1. Chester County Children & Youth Servs. v. Cunningham, 636 A.2d 1157,
1158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), aff'd, 656 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1995). At the time the children
came to live with the Cunninghams, N.A.W., a boy, was ten days old and A.L.O., a
girl, was two and one-half years old. Cunningham, 636 A.2d at 1158.
2. Id. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a) (1990). Section 2512(a) states:
(a) Who may file.-A petition to terminate parental rights with respect to a
child under the age of 18 years may be filed by any of the following:
(1) Either parent when termination is sought with respect to other par-
ent.
(2) An agency.
(3) The individual having custody or standing in loco parentis to the
child and who has filed a report of intention to adopt required by sec-
tion 2531 (relating to report of intention to adopt).
Id.
3. Chester County Children & Youth Servs. v. Cunningham, 656 A.2d 1346,
1347 (Pa. 1995).
4. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1347. The foster parents were notified by letter
that because Mr. Cunningham was 63 years old and Mrs. Cunningham was 50 years
old, the Agency would not consent to the proposed adoption. Id.
5. Id. In July of 1991, the Cunninghams adopted their foster children, Joshua
and his sister Tatiana, with Agency approval. Id. at 1347-48.
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Cunningham family would not be in the best interests of the
children.6 The Cunninghams began adoption proceedings by
filing a Report of Intention to Adopt 7 and disregarded the lack
of Agency consent to the adoption process.8 The Agency
countered by filing preliminary objections9 to the Report of
6. Id. at 1348. The Agency determined that the best interests of the children
would be better served if the children were adopted by a younger couple. Id.
7. Reports of Intention to Adopt are defined in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2531
(1990 & Supp. 1995). Section 2531 states:
(a) General rule.-Every person now having or hereafter receiving or retaining
custody or physical care of any child for the purpose or with the intention of
adopting a child under the age of 18 years shall report to the court in which
the petition for adoption will be filed.
(b) Contents.-The report shall set forth:
(1) The circumstances surrounding the persons receiving or retaining
custody or physical care of the child, including the date upon which a
preplacement investigation was concluded.
(2) The name, sex, racial background, age, date and place of birth and
religious affiliation of the child.
(3) The name and address of the intermediary.
(4) An itemized accounting of moneys and consideration paid or to be
paid to the intermediary.
(5) Whether the parent or parents whose parental rights are to be ter-
minated have received counseling with respect to the termination and
the alternatives thereto. If so, the report shall state the dates on which
the counseling was provided and the name and address of the counselor
or agency which provided the counseling.
(6) The name, address and signature of the person or persons making
the report. Immediately above the signature of the person or persons
intending to adopt the child shall appear the following statement:
I acknowledge that I have been advised or know and understand
that the natural parent may revoke the consent to the adoption of
this child until a court has entered a decree terminating the pa-
rental rights and, unless a decree terminating parental rights has
been entered, the natural parent may revoke the consent until the
court enters the final adoption decree.
(7) A copy of the preplacement report prepared pursuant to section 2530
(relating to home study and preplacement report).
When a person receives or retains custody or physical care of a child from an
agency, the report shall set forth only the name and address of the agency,
the circumstances surrounding such person receiving or retaining custody or
physical care of the child and a copy of the preplacement report prepared
pursuant to section 2530.
(c) When report not required.-No report shall be required when the child is
the child, grandchild, stepchild, brother or sister of the whole or half blood, or
niece or nephew by blood, marriage or adoption of the person receiving or re-
taining custody or physical care.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2531.
8. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1348.
9. Id. Preliminary objections were filed by the Agency on the basis that the
Cunninghams lacked standing to file a Report of Intention to Adopt. Id. Preliminary
objections are a procedural device used to attack the merits of the pleadings of the
opposing party. See PA. R. Crv. P. 1028.
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Intention to Adopt."0  The Agency alleged that the
Cunninghams, as foster parents, lacked the necessary
standing1 to adopt the children. 2
The court of common pleas overruled the Agency's preliminary
objections." The superior court reversed the trial court's ruling
and dismissed the Report of Intention to Adopt." The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur5 in order to
resolve the issue of whether foster parents lack standing to
adopt their foster children without the express consent of a child
welfare agency."6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in an evenly divided
opinion, upheld the ruling of the superior court because a
majority decision could not be reached. 7 The Opinion in
Support of Affirmance reiterated that foster parents lack
sufficient standing to adopt foster children in situations where
consent has been withheld by a child welfare agency. 8 Both the
Opinion in Support of Affirmance and the Opinion in Support of
Reversal 9 analyzed the applicability of In re Adoption of
Hess,"0 the leading case addressing the issue of intervention in
adoption proceedings, and determined that Hess was not controlling.2'
10. Cunningham, 656 A_2d at 1348.
11. Id. "Standing to sue' means that [a] party has sufficient stake in an oth-
erwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." BLAC-
K'S LAW DICTIONARY 1405 (6th ed. 1990).
12. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1348.
13. Cunningham, 636 A.2d at 1158.
14. Id. at 1160.
15. See Chester County Children & Youth Servs. v. Cunningham, 645 A.2d
1311 (Pa. 1994) (granting allocatur). Allocatur is a term used to denote that a writ
or order is allowed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1348.
17. Id. at 1347. Three justices believed the opinion of the lower court should
have been affirmed and three justices believed that the lower court should have
been reversed. Id. Justice Flaherty filed the Opinion in Support of Affirmance in
which Justices Zappala and Cappy joined. Id. (Flaherty, J., Opinion in Support of
AfTirmance).
18. Id. at 1351.
19. Justice Montemuro filed the Opinion in Support of Reversal in which Chief
Justice Nix and Justice Castille joined. Id. at 1351 (Montemuro, J., Opinion in Sup-
port of Reversal).
20. 608 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1992) (holding that grandparents have standing to inter-
vene in adoption proceedings). See infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Hess.
21. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1348-53. The justices supporting affirmance de-
ternined that the holding in Hess was strictly limited to the facts of the case;
namely that the case involved grandparent intervention in adoption proceedings and
not foster parent standing to adopt. Id. at 1348. The justices supporting reversal
stated that the holding in Hess was instructive because it supported the proposition
that courts have discretion to dispense with agency consent when necessary. Id. at
1353.
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The Opinion in Support of Affirmance analyzed the applicable
Pennsylvania statutes22 which define who may file a Report of
Intent to Adopt, and determined that foster parents are not
included in those who are entitled to file a Report of Intention to
Adopt.23 In defining the inherent nature of a foster parent's
role, the justices supporting affirmance noted that the foster
parent-foster child relationship is one that is not permanent in
terms of duration.2 ' The justices recognized that the foster
parent role has been determined to be a limited one, necessarily
subordinate to the role of a child welfare agency.25 The justices
in support of affirmance reiterated the fact that Pennsylvania
requires written consent of an agency in matters concerning
custody of foster children, without which foster parents lack
standing to proceed with the adoption process.26 The justices
stated that the legislature had established procedures to
determine what is in the best interests of foster children.2 7
Therefore, in the opinion of the justices, agency consent to foster
parent adoption is a necessary part of the adoption process. 8
In contrast, the justices supporting reversal stated that the
superior court improperly implemented the doctrine of standing
as it relates to foster parents' rights to file Reports of Intent to
Adopt. 29 The justices opined that in order for standing to be
22. Id. at 1349-50. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2312, 2531(a), (c), 2711(a)(5),
2713(2) (1991 & Supp. 1995). Section 2312 states: "Any individual may become an
adopting parent." Id. § 2312. Section 2531 describes Reports of Intention to Adopt.
See id. § 2531. Section 2711(a)(5), which sets forth consent criteria necessary for
adoption, states:
(a) General rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this part, consent to an
adoption shall be required of the following:
(5) The guardian of the person of an adoptee under the age of 18 years,
if any there be, or of the person or persons having the custody of the
adoptee, if any such person can be found, whenever the adoptee has no
parent whose consent is required.
Id. § 2711(aX5). Section 2713(2) pertains to situations where consent is not required.
See id. § 2713(2). Section 2713(2) states: "The court, in its discretion, may dispense
with consents other than that of the adoptee to a petition for adoption when: . . .
(2) the adoptee is under 18 years of age and has no parent living whose consent is
required." Id.
23. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1349.




27. Id. at 1351.
28. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1350.
29. Id. at 1351. The justices supporting reversal agreed with the justices sup-
porting affirmance regarding the foster parents' role and that normally, agency con-
sent is necessary. Id. at 1353. However, the justices supporting reversal recognized
780 Vol. 34:777
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present, an individual must have some substantial and easily
ascertainable interest in the determination of the matter.30 The
justices asserted that the language of the applicable
Pennsylvania statutes grants such an interest in adoption
proceedings in situations where foster parents are
participants."' The justices supporting reversal determined that
if foster parents were completely forbidden from adopting their
foster children without agency consent, they would never have
standing because the required interest in the outcome of the
proceedings would not be present.32 The opinion of the justices
supporting affirmance, as interpreted by the justices supporting
reversal, overlooked the fact that Pennsylvania courts could
utilize their discretion in determining what is in the best
interests of a child and could therefore dispense with agency
consent whenever a court deems it appropriate.3
The justices supporting reversal believed that the justices
supporting affirmance misstated the doctrine of standing.'
Standing, as interpreted by the justices supporting reversal, is
not a tool to be used to promote public policy.35 Standing, the
justices noted, is a device to ensure that a party has a
significant interest in the determination of a proceeding.3" The
justices supporting reversal stated that foster parents' interests
in adoption proceedings are determined not by their nexus with
the controversy, but by the will of a child welfare agency. 7 The
justices stated that ultimate power belongs to the courts to
determine what is in the best interests of foster children. 8 The
that courts may dispense with agency consent when necessary. Id. Thus, foster par-
ent standing is not necessarily precluded. Id.
30. Id. at 1351-52 The justices stated that, "[t]o have standing, a party must
have a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the litigation; that interest must
be direct and immediate, not remote." Id. at 1351 (quoting South Whitehall Town-
ship Police Serv. v. South Whitehall Township, 555 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa. 1989)).
31. Id. at 1351. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2312, 2531(a), (c), 2711(a)(5), 2713.
32. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1352. The justices stated that if courts did not
have the discretion to dispense with agency consent, cases in which agency consent
is withheld would not be justiciable and therefore petitioners for adoption would
have no standing. Id. "Justiciable" is defined as a "[miatter appropriate for court re-
view." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (6th ed. 1990).
33. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1353.
34. Id. The justices supporting reversal stated that the justices supporting
affirmance used the doctrine of standing to prevent foster parent adoption, absent




38. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1353-54. The justices supporting reversal stated
that the ultimate decision-making power resides in the courts and that the courts
have superior power over the child welfare agency when the determination of what
1996
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justices noted that foster parent standing is not synonymous
with a granted adoption, it merely ensures the foster parents'
right to be heard in court.39  A child welfare agency's
determinations, the justices commented, are always subject to
judicial review.' The justices further noted that final decision-
making power resides with the courts, not a child welfare
agency, and therefore foster parent standing does not hinge on
agency consent.4 The justices supporting reversal ultimately
determined that foster parents do not lack standing to file
Reports of Intention to Adopt their foster children. 2
Both the justices supporting affirmance and the justices
supporting reversal determined that the Pennsylvania General
Assembly intended that agency consent be a requirement in any
adoption proceeding brought by foster parents.' However, the
justices supporting reversal also determined that the legislature
intended that courts might dispense with agency consent when a
court determines that the agency unreasonably withheld its
consent."
As early as 1949, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of the rights of foster parents to retain custody of
their foster children and the role that Pennsylvania courts
should play in determining the extent of those rights.' In
Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard," child
custody was awarded to foster parents, the Gards, pursuant to a
contractual agreement that provided for a child welfare agency's
retention of all decision-making power regarding the child. 7
When the agency later demanded that the Gards relinquish
custody, they refused.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
is in the best interests of the child is at issue. Id.
39. Id. at 1354.
40. Id. The justices recognized that in most cases courts will defer to the
judgment of an agency as to what is in the best interests of a child. Id. However,
the justices noted, this does not alter the fact that the power of final determination
resides in the courts. Id.
41. Id. The justices opined that the courts could have dispensed with agency
consent in this case, thereby allowing the adoption proceedings to continue. Id. at
1353.
42. Id. at 1354.
43. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1349-55.
44. Id. at 1353-54.
45. See Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 66 A.2d 300 (Pa.
1949) (holding that the most important factor in cases involving child custody should
be what is in the best interests of the child).
46. 66 A.2d 300 (Pa. 1949).
47. Gard, 66 A.2d at 302.
48. Id. The Gards had expressed to the agency their desire to adopt the child.
Id. Several months later, the agency demanded return of the child, giving the Gards
782 Vol. 34:777
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decided that cases involving a child's well-being should not be
determined based solely on an agency's claim that the agency
has an absolute custodial right to the child.49 The court
recognized that it is the role of the judiciary to determine what
is in the best interests of a child.5" In Gard, the court
determined that removal of the child from the Gard home would
be cruel and therefore the foster parents were awarded custody
of the child.51
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania relied on the holding in
Gard in Commonwealth ex rel. Bankert v. Children's Services.52
The issue addressed by the superior court was the significance of
an agreement that permitted the agency, Child Services, to
retain all decision-making power.5" The Bankerts had custody
of the child for the first nine years of the child's life. 4 Despite
the fact that the child wished to stay with the Bankerts and the
Bankerts intended to adopt the child, the agency determined
that the best interests of the child would be served by removing
the child from the Bankert's home.55 The superior court stated
that the best interests of a child should be the focal point of a
court's determination of custody.5" The court noted that foster
parents may be the only real parents that a child has known
and this fact should have considerable significance for a court
determining with whom a child should be placed. 7 The
superior court concluded that a judicial determination of a
child's best interests is superior to a contract permitting an
no reason for the demand. Id.
49. Id. at 304. The court stated that nothing could be more cruel than the
separation of a child and its loving foster parents. Id. at 306. The court declared
that this type of separation "is equally cruel whether it was brought about by
'kidnapping' or by legal process." Id.
50. Id at 305. The court determined that it is the courts' role to examine all
of the facts regarding a child's situation and to make a decision as to who should
have custody of the child. Id.
51. Id. at 306-07.
52. 307 A.2d 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
53. Bankert, 307 A.2d at 412-13. The trial court upheld the agreement and
granted custody to the agency. Id. at 413. The superior court reversed the trial
court's ruling and remanded the case so that a factual inquiry could be made as to
what was in the best interests of the child. Id. at 415.
54. Id. at 412.
55. Id. at 412-13.
56. Id. at 414.
57. Id. (citing Davies Adoption Case, 46 A.2d 252 (Pa. 1945)). The court stated
that the continuous custody by a child's foster parents during the child's life and the
devastating effects on the child that could potentially result from a forced separation




agency complete discretion over the custody of the child.5"
In Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service," the
Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the issue of whether
foster parents have standing to protest the removal of their
foster children by a child welfare agency."0 The foster parents,
the Stapletons, contested the removal of their foster child when
a child welfare agency attempted, for the second time, to return
the child to the custody of its natural parents.6 The court, in
finding that foster parents have standing to contest the removal
of their foster child, acknowledged that it is the courts' role to
determine what is in the best interests of a child. 2 The
protection of the family unit should always be foremost, the
court noted, but when a child has already been removed from its
parents and the parents' rights have been terminated, the need
for the court to protect that relationship has ended. 3 The court
declared that once the natural family unit has been disbanded,
the court assumes the role of an arbiter and functions to
determine what is in the best interests of the child." The
superior court reversed the trial court and ordered a new
hearing to determine whether the child's best interests would be
served by the foster parents' retention of custody. 5
In 1976, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re Adoption
of R.I.,66 addressed the issue of what standards should be used
when deciding whether natural parents' rights to custody of
their children should be permanently terminated, thus allowing
the children's foster parents the opportunity to adopt. 7 The
child in In re Adoption of R.I. had been neglected by her natural
parents, and had lived in foster care for more than eight
58. Bankert, 307 A.2d at 413-14 (citing Gard, 66 A.2d at 304).
59. 324 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
60. Stapleton, 324 A.2d at 565.
61. Id. at 564-65. Stapleton involved a boy that was placed in the foster care
of the Stapletons after he was removed from his natural parents' custody. Id. at
564. The child had been returned to his natural parents and subsequently removed
once more, at which time permanent custody was awarded to the agency. Id. He
was once again placed with his foster parents and the agency attempted to again
remove him from the foster parents and return him to his natural parents. Id. The
foster parents contested the removal, resulting in litigation. Id.
62. Id. at 568-72.
63. Id. at 571. The court stated that judicial restraint should be used when a
court determines whether to disband the family unit. Id. at 570. However, the foster
parents in Stapleton entered the controversy after parental custody rights had been
terminated. Id. at 571.
64. Id. at 571.
65. Stapleton, 324 A.2d at 573-74.
66. 361 A.2d 294 (Pa. 1976).
67. In re Adoption of R.I., 361 A.2d at 297-98.
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years." The court recognized that removal of a child from a
foster home might create psychological and emotional distress
equal to that caused by removal from natural parents."
The court determined that there was compelling evidence of
neglect and that R.I.'s best interests would only be served by the
termination of her natural parents' custody rights.70 The court
stated that R.I.'s best interests would be served by changing her
foster child status to that of a permanently adopted child.'
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established that
the interests of foster parents who wish to adopt their foster
children may supersede the interests of children's natural
parents in certain situations.72
In 1984, in In re Adoption of Crystal,73 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether foster parents lack
standing to file a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights.74
Upon request of the foster parents, who filed a Report of
Intention to Adopt, the trial court terminated the natural
parents' custody rights to the child.75  On appeal, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the foster parents had no
standing to petition for termination of parental rights."
68. Id. at 295. The child suffered from malnutrition and many other physical
ailments. Id. The natural father was unemployed and an alcoholic and the family
had been evicted from its home and had no prospect of obtaining adequate living ar-
rangements. Id. at 296. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that courts have
the difficult task of weighing conflicting interests. Id. at 297. The state must protect
children from parental neglect and abuse; however, the state also has a strong inter-
est in the cohesion of the family unit. Id. The court stated that a child should not
be removed from its family, unless removal is clearly necessary. rd. at 298 (citing In
re Rinker, 117 A.2d 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955)). The best interests of R.I., as deter-
mined by the court, would only be served by termination of the rights of the natural
parents. Id. at 300. R.I. had lived with her foster parents for over eight years and
had no contact with her natural parents for six years. Id.
69. Id. at 300 n.13.
70. Id. at 300.
71. Id. The court stated that the foster parents had become the only parents
that R.I. had known and had filled the void left by the child's natural parents when
the natural parents relinquished care and control of R.I. Id.
72. In re Adoption of R.L, 361 A.2d at 298-300. The court established prece-
dent that natural parental rights may be terminated upon the request of foster par-
ents if the natural parents neglect to care for and retain custody of their natural
children. Id.
73. 480 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
74. In re Adoption of Crystal, 480 A.2d at 1147. Crystal, the child whose cus-
tody was in question, was placed with the Berks County Children and Youth Ser-
vices in 1975. Id. The agency then placed Crystal with her foster parents almost a
year later. Id. The foster parents had custody of-the child for over six years. Id.
75. Id. The Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Orphans Court, termi-
nated the natural parents' rights because the child had been living in foster care for
six years and the foster parents provided specialized care for the child required by
the child's physical and mental impairments. Id.
76. Id. at 1153. The superior court determined that the relationship between
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In order to resolve the conflict between the lower courts, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in In re Adoption of Crystal,
examined section 2512(a) of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 7
which dictates who may file for involuntary termination of
parental rights.7' The foster parents argued that their physical
custody of the child met the requirement of "custody," as
required by section 2512(a)(3), and that they had standing in
loco parentis.9
In In re Adoption of Crystal, the superior court determined
that foster parents, although they may have physical custody of
the foster child, do not have legal custody of the child.8"
Although the superior court held that the foster parents lacked
standing to terminate parental rights, the court remanded the
case to the trial court to determine, as per the requests of the
agency, what provisions should be made for the child."1
Foster parent standing was once again at issue in Priester v.
Fayette County Children & Youth Services.82 The issue in
Priester was whether former foster parents, no longer in custody
of a child, possessed the necessary standing to regain custody. 3
The foster parents in Priester attempted to regain custody of
their foster child after the child had been removed from their
foster parents and a child is subordinate to both the relationship of the agency to
the child and the relationship of the natural parents to the child. Id. at 1151.
77. Id. at 1148. See Pennsylvania Adoption Act of 1980, 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 2512 (1990).
78. See supra note 2 for the text of 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2512(a).
79. In re Adoption of Crystal, 480 A.2d at 1148. A person standing in loco pa-
rentis stands "[i]n place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged factitiously, with a
parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed.
1990).
80. In re Adoption of Crystal, 480 A.2d at 1148-49. The court opined that the
agency retains legal custody of a child and may require that the foster parents re-
linquish physical custody of the child when the agency deems it necessary. Id. at
1149. The court also determined that the state legislature did not intend that foster
parents may file a petition to terminate parental rights, due to the fact that the
individual filing the petition was standing in loco parentis to the foster child. Id. at
1151. The court found that the role of foster parents is subordinate to that of the
agency. Id. The superior court stated that it is an agency's role to find a permanent
home for a child; not the role of foster parents. Id. at 1152. The court recognized
that foster care is not necessarily excluded from being permanent in nature. Id. at
1152 n.4. The court's decision was limited to the determination that foster parents
have no standing to petition for termination of parental rights. Id. at 1153. The
court refused to address the issue of whether the child should have been adopted by
the foster parents. Id.
81. Id. at 1153. While the provisions for the child were being made, the agen-
cy retained legal custody of the child and the foster parents retained physical cus-
tody. Id.
82. 512 A.2d 683, 683 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
83. Priester, 512 A.2d at 683.
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custody and was placed in another foster home, where a sibling
of the child had also been placed.8" The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that the foster parents lacked the necessary
standing." The superior court stated that the basic goal of any
custody proceeding is to provide for the best interests of the
child.86 Although the superior court determined that there was
no controlling precedent, it noted that a Pennsylvania trial court
had addressed the issue of whether foster parents lack standing
to adopt their foster child without express written consent of the
child's legal custodian. 7
In Priester, the superior court held that the best interests of a
child are served by allowing an agency to retain legal custody.'
Therefore, the court stated, the foster parents lacked standing to
contest the agency's custody. 9 The court concluded that the
best interests of the child would be served by not disturbing the
child's current living arrangements with her brother and her
new parents."
In 1987 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that foster
parents lacked standing to adopt their foster children in In re
Adoption of S.C.P.9" In In re Adoption of S.C.P., the trial court
denied the former foster parents' efforts to adopt S.C.P."2 The
84. Id. The foster parents had custody of the child for two years. Id. The
foster parents were of no relation to the child. Id.
85. Id. The court defined foster care as substitute family care that is non-
institutional, and care that is for a specific duration, either temporary or extended.
Id. The court made a distinction between foster care and adoptive placement, which
is permanent in nature. Id. (citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816 (1977)). The court determined that the best interests of the child were con-
trolling and would be better served by allowing the child to stay with her sibling.
Id. at 685. A concurring opinion determined that, although the foster parents might
have had standing to contest the removal of the child prior to the actual removal,
they did not have standing to contest the removal after the fact. Id. (Beck, J., con-
curring).
86. Id. at 684. The court noted that the best interests of a child have been
determined to encompass the child's physical, mental, moral and spiritual well being.
Id.
87. Id. See Bolte Adoption, 67 Montg. Cty. Rep. 106 (C.P. Montg. Cty. 1951)
(holding that foster parents have no standing to adopt without express written con-
sent of a child's legal custodian).
88. Priester 512 A.2d at 685. The court determined that the best interests of
the child would be served by allowing the child to reside in the foster home with
her brother. Id.
89. id. The court stated that absent express written consent by an agency
which has legal custody of a child, foster parents who have only physical custody
lack standing to petition the court to regain custody. Id. at 684 (citing Bolte Adop-
tion).
90. Id. at 685.
91. 527 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
92. In re Adoption of S.C.P., 527 A.2d at 1053.
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former foster parents and the guardian ad litem3 of the child
then appealed to the superior court."'
The court noted that the foster parents of S.C.P. had been
informed of the temporary nature of their status as foster
parents, and that the status would last only until an adoptive
home could be found for S.C.P 5 The foster parents refused to
relinquish custody of S.C.P. and filed a Report of Intent to
Adopt.96 The trial court ordered the foster parents to relinquish
custody of the child. 7 The superior court applied the holding in
Priester to the facts regarding the foster parents of S.C.P.9 The
court determined that the holding in Priester was controlling,
and therefore S.C.P.'s foster parents lacked standing to pursue
the adoption.9  The superior court concluded that as
experienced foster parents, the foster parents of S.C.P. knew of
the temporary nature of their role and that they should not be
able to avoid the conditions placed upon that role."° The court
concluded that the best interests of S.C.P. would be served only
by allowing the legal custodian to control the adoption
proceedings and that the former foster parents should not
interfere in this process.0 1
In In re Adoption of Hess,"°2 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of whether a child's
grandparents may intervene in adoption proceedings when a
family services agency, as the legal custodian of the child,
objects to the intervention. 3 The children in In re Adoption of
93. "A guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed by the court in
which a particular litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn per-
son in that particular litigation, and the status of guardian ad litem exists only in
that specific litigation in which the appointment occurs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
706 (6th ed. 1990).
94. In re Adoption of S. C.P., 527 A.2d at 1053.
95. Id.
96. Id. In the brief filed on behalf of the foster parents, it was argued that
the foster parents became concerned that any removal of the foster child would
result in irreparable harm to the child, given the child's extremely strong at-
tachment to the foster parents. Brief for Appellant at 9, In re Adoption of S.C.P.
(No. 1348). The foster parents obtained four professional evaluations that concurred
that removal would irreparably harm the child. Id. at 13.
97. In re Adoption of S.C.P., 527 A.2d at 1053.
98. Id. at 1053-54. The court held that because it was determined in Priester
that foster parents lack standing to petition the court for adoption when agency
consent is withheld, the fact that consent was not given by the agency having legal
custody of S.C.P. precluded foster parent standing to adopt. Id. at 1054.
99. ld. at 1054.
100. Id.
101. ld.
102. 608 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1992).
103. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 11.
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Hess had been in the legal custody of a family services agency
and had been placed in an adoptive home."°' The grandparents
of the children contended that they were never informed of the
status of their grandchildren, despite their repeated
requests.' The grandparents filed a Petition of
Intervention' ° and a Stay of Proceedings,r 7 but the trial
court dismissed the petition and upheld the preliminary
objections of the agency.#° On appeal, the superior court
reversed the trial court's order, stayed the adoption proceedings,
and remanded the case for hearings on the grandparents'
petition."° The agency appealed the decision to the supreme
court, which granted allocatur.110
The supreme court analyzed the issue under the Adoption
Act.'" The supreme court determined that after termination of
parental rights, any individual could become an adoptive
parent."' In order to adopt, the court noted, a Report of
Intention to Adopt must be filed and a report must also be filed
by the agency or conduit which arranged the adoption, followed
by an inquiry into whether the adoption should proceed."' A
104. Id. The natural parents' rights were terminated and custody was granted
to the agency. Id. The agency then attempted to find adoptive parents for the chil-
dren. Id.
105. Id. The grandparents asserted that they made repeated requests to the
agency about the location of their grandchildren. Id. The grandparents claimed that
when they finally learned of the agency's attempt to have the children adopted, they
expressed their desire to provide a home for the children. Id. The grandparents
claimed that their efforts were ignored by the agency. Id.
106. Id. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2328. A Petition of Intervention is made in the form
of a plaintiffs initial pleading in a civil action, setting forth the reason for the re-
quested intervention and the relief sought. Id.
107. A stay of proceedings is a suspension of the proceedings, by court order,
usually where an act has not been completed by one of the parties. BLACK'S LAW DI-
CTIONARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990).
108. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 11-12.
109. Id. at 12. See In re Adoption of Hess, 562 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989),
affd, 608 A.2d 10 (Pa. 1992).
110. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 12.
111. Id. at 13. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2312.
112. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 13. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2312.
113. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 13. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2531(c),
2535 (1990). Section 2535 states:
(a) General rule.-When a report required by section 2531 (relating to a report
of intention to adopt) has been filed, the court shall cause an investigation to
be made and a report filed by a local public child care agency with its con-
sent or an appropriate person designated by the court. In lieu of the investi-
gation, the court may accept an investigation made by the agency which
placed the child and the report of the intermediary required by section 2533
(relating to report of intermediary).
(b) Matters covered.-The investigation shall cover all pertinent information
regarding the child's eligibility for adoption and the suitability of the place-
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Petition to Adopt"" must then be filed, the court noted, and a
court must consent to the adoption."' The supreme court noted
that a hearing must then be held to determine whether the
adoption should be granted."" The court stated that
throughout this entire process, the best interests of the child
have to be of utmost importance. "7
The supreme court acknowledged that when a court
ment, including the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the
child, and the child's and the adopting parents' age, sex, health and racial,
ethnic and religious background.
(c) Payment of costs.-The court may establish the procedure for the payment
of investigation costs.
Id. § 2535.
114. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 (Supp. 1995). Section 2701 states:
A petition for adoption shall set forth:
(1) The full name, residence, marital status, age, occupation, religious
affiliation and racial background of the adopting parent or parents and
their relationship, if any, to the adoptee.
(2) That the reports under sections 2530 (relating to home study and
replacement report), 2531 (relating to report of intention to adopt) and
2533 (relating to report of intermediary) have been filed, if required.
(3) The name and address of the intermediary, if any.
(4) The full name of the adoptee and the fact and length of time of the
residence of the adoptee with the adopting parent or parents.
(5) If there is no intermediary or if no report of the intermediary has
been filed or if the adoptee is over the age of 18 years, all vital statis-
tics and other information enumerated and required to be stated of the
record by section 2533, so far as applicable.
(6) If a change in the name of the adoptee is desired, the new name.
(7) That all consents required by section 2711 (relating to consents nec-
essary to adoption) are attached as exhibits or the basis upon which
such consents are not required.
(8) That it is the desire of the petitioner that the relationship of parent
and child be established between the petitioner or petitioners and the
adoptee.
(9) If no birth certificate or certification of registration of birth can be
obtained, a statement of the reason therefor and an allegation of the ef-
forts made to obtain the certificate with a request that the court estab-
lish a date and place of birth at the adoption hearing on the basis of
the evidence presented.
Id.
115. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A-2d at 13. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2701,
2711(a).
116. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 13. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2721
(1990). Section 2721 states:
The court shall fix a time and place for hearing. Notice of the hearing
shall be given to all persons whose consents are required and to such other
persons as the court shall direct. Notice to the parent or parents of the adopt-
ee, if required, may be given by the intermediary or someone acting on his
behalf. Notice shall be by personal service or by registered mail to the last
known address of the person to be notified or in such other manner as the
court shall direct.
117. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 13.
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determines that an agency's consent is being unreasonably
withheld, the court may dispense with the consent
requirement." The In re Adoption of Hess court determined
that the agency's consent was unreasonably withheld."'
Therefore, the court concluded, the grandparents did not lack
standing and were permitted to intervene, despite the lack of
consent of the agency.'.
The supreme court in Cunningham, in the wake of the Hess
decision, once again attempted to resolve the issue of standing
in adoption proceedings.' The supreme court was unable to
reach a consensus as to whether the absence of agency consent
precludes the standing necessary to initiate adoption
proceedings. 2 Therefore, the decision of the superior court
was affirmed. 2 '
In the 1980's, a conservative trend developed in Pennsylvania
law pertaining to foster parents' rights. 24 Prior to this time,
Pennsylvania courts were less likely to deny foster parents
standing in adoption and custody matters.12 The justices of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were diametrically opposed, in
Cunningham, in their view of the courts' role in the
determination of the best interests of children.2 6
The two opinions in Cunningham illustrate completely
different ideological stances on the role of the court regarding
child welfare. The court's Opinion in Support of Affirmance,
although it purported to expound on the issue of foster parents
standing, did not discuss the procedural aspects of standing."'
The justices that supported affirmance used the doctrine of
standing as a policy tool. 28 The justices stated that an agency
has legal custody of the foster children and therefore, has the
last word as to who should be entitled to adopt the children in
the agency's custody." The justices supporting affirmance
118. Id. at 14. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2711(a)(5).
119. In re Adoption of Hess, 608 A.2d at 14. The court pointed out that by
allowing the grandparents to have standing to intervene, it was not guaranteeing
that the grandparents would ultimately prevail. Id. at 15.
120. Id. at 15.
121. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1347.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.C.P., 527 A.2d at 1052; Priester, 512 A.2d at
683; In re Adoption of Crystal, 480 A.2d at 1146.
125. See, e.g., In re Adoption of R.I, 361 A.2d at 295.
126. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1347.





declared that foster parents had no greater interest in terms of
adopting a child, than any other adult playing a significant role
in a child's life. 3 ' The justices supporting affirmance
determined that it was the intent of the Pennsylvania
legislature to give the final power of consent as to who might
adopt foster children to child welfare agencies. 3 '
The justices that supported reversal of the superior court
decision examined the issue of foster parent standing as a
procedural matter.'32 These justices demonstrated a greater
willingness to allow courts to determine what is ultimately in
the best interests of children." The justices determined that it
was the intention of the Pennsylvania legislature to provide
judicial review of child welfare agencies, specifically pertaining
to the discretionary power to dispense with agency consent in
adoption proceedings." The justices supporting reversal stated
that standing is merely a doctrine used to ensure that the
parties to a controversy have a significant interest in the
outcome of the proceeding.' 3'
Acknowledging that a party has standing does nothing more
than allow that party to present its side of the argument to the
court. Standing has nothing to do with the merits of a party's
case and has no bearing on the determination of the case.
It is surprising that Pennsylvania, which continues to treat
the family unit with high regard, would risk denying a foster
child the only parents it may have known. It would seem that a
foster parent who oversees every aspect of a foster child's daily
activity, often for years at a time, might be in a better position
to determine what is in the best interests of that particular child
than would a government agency which cannot monitor the child
on a daily basis. By allowing child welfare agencies complete
control over matters concerning foster parent adoptions, without
the threat of judicial intervention, the justices that supported
affirmance of the superior court decision in Cunningham have
shown a faith in child welfare agencies' discretion that may be
unwarranted.
The issue of foster parent standing, when an agency withholds
consent to adopt, will surely be revisited. The issue has by no
means been resolved. The future composition of the court will be
130. Id.
131. Cunningham, 656 A.2d at 1351.
132. Id at 1354.
133. Id.
134. Id,
135. Id. at 1351.
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determinative of how long Cunningham remains good law in
Pennsylvania. However, at the present time, courthouse doors
remain closed to foster parents wishing to adopt their foster
children unless they have agency approval.
Thomas B. Anderson

